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Abstract Despite the wide range of possible sce-
narios in the aftermath of a disruptive event, each
community can make choices to improve its resilience,
or its ability to bounce back. A resilient community
is one that has prepared for, and can thus absorb,
recover from, and adapt to the disruptive event. One
important aspect of the recovery phase is assessing
the extent of the damage in the built environment
through post-event building inspections. In this pa-
per, we develop and demonstrate a resilience-based
methodology intended to support rapid post-event
decision-making about inspection priorities with lim-
ited information. The method uses the basic charac-
teristics of the building stock in a community (floor
area, number of stories, type of construction and
configuration) to assign structure-specific fragility
functions to each building. For an event with a given
seismic intensity, the probability of each building
reaching a particular damage state is determined,
and is used to predict the actual building states
and priorities for inspection. Losses are computed
based on building usage category, estimated inspec-
tion costs, the consequences of erroneous decisions,
and the potential for unnecessary restrictions in ac-
cess. The aim is to provide a means for a community
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to make rapid cost-based decisions related to inspec-
tion of their building inventory. We pose the decision
problem as an integer optimization problem that
attempts to minimize the expected loss to the com-
munity. The advantages of this approach are that it:
(i) is simple, (ii) requires minimal inventory data, (iii)
is easily scalable, and (iv) does not require significant
computing power. Use of this approach before the
hazard event can also provide a community with the
means to plan and allocate resources in advance of
an event to achieve the desirable resiliency goals of
the community.
Keywords Resilience, Built environment, Uncer-
tainty, Post-event inspection, Disruptive event,
Natural hazards
1 Introduction
The extraordinary impacts of recent extreme events
around the world illustrate the need for resilience in
our communities. Resilience refers to the ability of
a community to overcome disruptions and return to
a normal state while minimizing casualties, damage,
socio-economic, and ecological impacts associated
with a hazard event (e.g., hurricane, earthquake, or
tsunami) (Klein et al., 2003). A significant amount
of effort has been devoted to understanding what
characteristics make a community resilient (Rose,
2004; Cutter et al., 2008; Gunderson, 2010; Hutter
et al., 2013; Mieler et al., 2013, 2015). The focus
of the recent research varies from risk assessment,
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studying the impact of an event, or analyzing the
recovery of the built environment over time (Eguchi
et al., 1998; Ingram et al., 2006; Cavalieri et al., 2017).
Although many measures are being considered, there
is a strong consensus that an essential element of
resilience is the preparation for and conduct of rapid
and efficient assessment of the post-event situation,
e.g., see (Comerio, 1998; Pearce, 2003; Miles and
Chang, 2011).
In the case of the built environment, post-event
building assessment takes the form of expert inspec-
tion which is scheduled after the event. The classifi-
cation of a structure’s safety level is necessary both
for preventing further loss of life and for planning re-
covery actions to return the community to normalcy.
The approach used in ATC-20 is to classify structures
as inspected (no considerable damage and residents
are allowed to occupy the building), restricted use
(partially damaged but some parts of the building are
usable), or unsafe (severely damaged and all persons
are restricted from entering) (Applied Technology
Council, 1982) Variations on this exist in various
places in the world, and for different types of stake-
holders. A major post-disaster challenge that hinders
community resilience is the backlog created from the
sheer volume of buildings needing inspection (Goulet
et al., 2015). For example, the average wait time
for a field inspection after Hurricane Harvey was 45
days, and after Hurricane Irma it was about a month
(Fernandez et al., 2017). As insurance payments are
curbed and rebuilding is stalled, the recovery of the
affected community is halted, and victims remain in
limbo. There is an urgent need to make the post-
event inspection process of the built environment
more informative and more efficient.
To support decision-making during routine in-
spection procedures for infrastructure systems, sev-
eral methods have been developed to strategically
mitigate risks (Frangopol and Estes, 1999; Straub
and Faber, 2005; Phan and Zhu, 2015; Frangopol
and Soliman, 2016; Yousefi and Coit, 2019). For in-
stance, regulations in place in many nations around
the world require that bridges over a certain size
be inspected at least every 24 months, with certain
local variations in the details (Hearn, 2007). How-
ever, in the immediate aftermath of a disruptive
hazardous event, planning the post-event inspection
of the infrastructure systems poses a different type of
challenge (Alexander, 2004). Restrictions in the time
and resources available and wide-ranging scope of the
inspections needed require that strategic decisions
be made quickly. Ramirez et al. (2000) developed a
handbook for the inspection of the Indiana bridge
network, focusing on how to evaluate the condition of
each type of bridge. The prioritization of those inspec-
tions was left to the state agency. Bensi et al. (2014)
used a Bayesian network and influence diagrams to
analyze the performance of a centrally-managed in-
frastructure system (here, a bridge network) and its
components after an extreme event. Using a network-
level approach, they considered whether or not to
inspect each bridge component, or to implement mit-
igation actions, e.g., reduce operation or completely
shut down the component to avoid further losses.
Bensi et al. (2014) also introduced the concept of the
value of information (VoI) pertaining to assessment
in spatially distributed infrastructures to determine a
temporal ordering of the inspection of the structure’s
components based on the output of the influence dia-
gram. VoI is used to quantify the benefit of gathering
additional information before taking action, e.g., a
decision to shut down a component or keep it in op-
eration. Among the possible inspection alternatives,
the approach taken here is that the highest-priority
alternative is the one that derives the largest benefit
from an inspection.
Indeed, the method discussed above is powerful
in terms of integrating various types and levels of
information in restoration decisions. However, im-
plementation of this method does require access to
comprehensive inventories, detailed asset descriptions
and spatial information. It is well-suited for dealing
with networks of privately-operated (e.g., railways) or
publicly-managed (e.g., bridges and dams) infrastruc-
ture under the control of a single owner that has kept
detailed maintenance records. There are three main
reasons why, at the present time, this framework may
not be appropriate in general for communities. First,
the detailed datasets needed for the implementation
of the framework is not typically available in commu-
nities because of the high monetary cost associated
with their maintenance. Second, this method is not
intended to weigh the estimated cost of inspections,
or the potential consequences (e.g., costs) of making
incorrect decisions under such traumatic conditions.
Finally, this method focuses only on the response in
the aftermath of an observed event. Limitations arise
when dealing with budgeting for uncertain future
events. Forward-thinking communities interested in
promoting resilience should be ready to act after an
event, but should also prepare for such an unforeseen
event by deciding on their objectives. For communi-
ties to cope with realistic large-scale disruptive events,
a simple and flexible approach is needed that can be
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applied to small and large communities, for various
types of disruptions, and with varying levels of data.
The objective of the paper is to provide a simple
approach and an associated computational tool to
support rapid decision-making related to post-event
inspections. With such a capability, a community
can make rapid decisions related to inspection of
their building inventory, based on the likely economic
cost associated with restricting access to that inven-
tory, and given a pre-determined budget. This can
be achieved through the combination of structure-
specific fragility functions and cost-based decision-
making. We formulate this problem mathematically
by assuming that the community is a rational agent
seeking to minimize the expected cost of the disrup-
tion as well as the risk of its actions. T he inputs
are the cost of closure of each building when it is
the correct action to take, the cost of closure when
it is unnecessary (i.e., when the structure is actually
not unsafe and the building is mistakenly restricted),
and the likelihood of damage to each structure for a
given intensity event. The output of the approach is
the prioritized order for inspection to most effectively
allocate resources on a limited budget. With this ca-
pability a community will reduce recovery time after
an event by accelerating the inspection process to
restore confidence in our structures.
The advantages of this approach are that it (i)
is simple, (ii) requires minimal inventory data, (iii)
is easily scalable, and (iv) does not require signifi-
cant computing power. In addition, it can be used
either immediately after a disruptive event or in the
planning stage to set a budget to prepare for poten-
tial future disruptive events with that community’s
objectives in mind. This method also generates ac-
tionable information that a community can choose to
implement to be prepared for future events, i.e., to
become more resilient. The approach is demonstrated
using a crowd-sourced dataset, collected as a part of
the EU-funded project, SASPARM2.0 (Grigoratos
et al., 2018). However, the approach can readily be
adapted to consider spatially-distributed networks
of other classes of infrastructure, or combinations
thereof, and to support other types of decisions when
resources are limited.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Sec. (2) presents the problem statement and
formulation. Sec. (3) provides an illustrative example
to demonstrate the methodology including results
and discussion. The concluding remarks are provided
in Sec. (4).
2 Methodology
2.1 Post-event inspection as a decision-making
problem
Consider a community with n buildings with exposure
to hazards. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be the index assigned
to identify each building. With the variable bi we
denote the building characteristics, e.g., number of
stories, type of construction, floor area. The random
variable (r.v.) X ∈ [0,∞) characterizes the hazard
intensity. To indicate a building’s safety level we use
the discrete-valued r.v. Si. The definition and num-
ber of these safety levels should be determined by
relevant stakeholders, and different approaches have
been taken in various regions (Applied Technology
Council, 1982; Baggio et al., 2007; Marshall et al.,
2013). Without loss of generality, we assume that Si
takes values in {1, 2, 3} and that structural damage
is more severe as Si increases. The conditional proba-
bility of building i being at safety level Si = si after
a hazardous event with intensity X = x is denoted
by P[Si = si|X = x], see Sec. 2.2.
Let di ∈ {1, 2, 3} be the decision variable corre-
sponding to the safety level assigned each building (1
= “safety level 1”, 2 = “safety level 2”, 3 = “safety
level 3”). We can determine di in one of two ways:
(1) We can perform a field inspection revealing the
true state of the building, but at a fixed cost wi, see
Sec. 2.3; or (2) We can select di based on building
characteristics bi and the observed hazard event in-
tensity X = x without an inspection, i.e., using a
decision function d∗i (x), see Sec. 2.3. The latter is
an effective option when there is a high post-event
probability of the building being at a given state,
e.g., when the model is confident that the building
is either safe or is damaged significantly (i.e., it is
not safe to enter). Being wrong, however, can be
costly to the community. This misprediction cost,
denoted as ci(di, si) := c(di, si; bi), is an increasing
function of the discrepancy between the predicted
state di and the true state si. The misprediction
cost also depends on the use of the structure. To
construct d∗i (x) we minimize the expected cost of a
wrong safety level assignment, see Sec. 2.3 for the
mathematical details. For this section, let c∗i (x) be
the minimum expected cost of potential casualties,
economic, social, and environmental losses, resulting
from selecting d∗i (x). Given a fixed budget r > 0
allocated at time t0 = 0, how should the community
choose which buildings to inspect in case an event
with intensity x occurs at time t? If the community
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is risk-neutral, then it should minimize the expected
discounted cost of its actions, see Sec. 2.3. Let zi
be a binary decision variable representing whether
to accept the optimal predetermined safety level for
building i, zi = 0, or to inspect the building, zi = 1.
Collectively, let z1:N = (z1, . . . , zN ) be the vector
representing the decisions for all buildings. The op-
timal decision, z∗1:N (t, x; r), minimizes the expected
cost subject to inspection budget constraints. Math-
ematically, the optimal decision solves:
min
z1:n∈{0,1}N
N∑
i=1
c∗i (x)(1− zi), (1)
subject to the budget constraint:
n∑
i=1
eγtwizi ≤ eαtr, (2)
where γ > 0 is inflation rate, and α ≥ 0 is the re-
turn rate of the safe asset in which the community
invested its budget at time t0 = 0. The optimization
problem by Eqs. (1) and (2) is known as a knap-
sack problem (Kellerer et al., 2004). We can solve
this problem through the dynamic programming al-
gorithm implemented in OR-Tools Python library
(Google optimization tools, 2019).
But how should the community set its initial
inspection budget r? To answer this question, assume
that the community responds to an event of intensity
X occurring at a random time T by solving the above-
mentioned knapsack problem. Then, the cost C to
the community is the cost of inspection plus the cost
to the community from making incorrect predictions
(note that correct predictions do not add to the cost
to the community), i.e., C is the r.v.
C(T,X, S1:N ) =
eγT
N∑
i=1
[wizi(T,X; r)+ci(d
∗
i (X), Si)(1−z∗i (T,X; r))],
(3)
where S1:N = (S1, . . . , SN ). A risk-neutral commu-
nity would seek to minimize its discounted expected
cost, i.e., it would select the budget by solving:
min
r∈[0,∞)
E[e−βTC(T,X, S1:N )], (4)
where E[·] denotes the expectation over all random
variables, and β > 0 is the discount rate of the com-
munity. Now, a risk-averse community would be in-
terested in keeping the variance of C under control,
it would also seek to solve:
min
r∈[0,∞)
V[e−βTC(T,X, S1:N )], (5)
where V[·] is the variance operator. In Sec. 2.4, we
discuss how we derive the Pareto front of the stochas-
tic multi-objective optimization problem defined by
Eqs. (4) and (5).
2.2 Quantifying the conditional probability of a
building’s safety state given the event intensity
The conditional probabilities associated with the dam-
age levels of the building after the hazard are defined
as a set of fragility functions (Porter and Kiremid-
jian, 2000; Baker, 2015; Silva et al., 2019). A fragility
function Fi,l(x) describes the conditional probability
of the i-th building response Yi exceeding a certain
threshold δi,l of damage level l, given the event in-
tensity X = x , and is mathematically defined as:
Fi,l(x) = P[Y > δi,l|X = x], for l = 0, 1. (6)
To predict the post-event safety state of the building
we need to determine the probability of experiencing
each safety state using the concept of fragility func-
tion. The first step is to associate the safety sates
of the buildings with certain damage level ranges.
Assuming that the building is in the “safety level
1” state when Yi < δi,0, in the “safety level 2” state
when δi,0 < Yi < δi,1, and in the “safety level 3” state
when Yi > δi,1, we have:
P [Si = “safety level 1”|X = x] =
P [Yi < δi,0|X = x] =
1 − P [Yi > δi,0|X = x] =
1 − Fi,0(x),
(7)
P [Si = “safety level 2”|X = x] =
P [δi,0 < Yi < δi,1|X = x] =
P [Yi > δi,0|X = x]−
P [Yi > δi,1|X = x] =
Fi,0(x)− Fi,1(x),
(8)
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and
P [Si = “safety level 3”|X = x] =
P [Yi > δi,1|X = x] =
Fi,1(x).
(9)
To assign the proper fragility function to the build-
ing i, we consider the pre-event characteristics of
the building, e.g., number of stories and structural
construction and configuration, denoted as bi. The
pre-event characteristics of the buildings can be ex-
tracted by using automated methods, developed re-
cently (Yeum et al., 2018; Lenjani et al., 2019b,a).
2.3 Predicted safety level optimization
Predicting the safety level of the buildings based on
their pre-event characteristics is subject to errors. To
minimize the adverse consequences of these decisions,
first we need to quantify the imposed cost of each
decision on the community. Specifically, let ci(di, si)
be the cost (in dollars) imposed on the community
by selecting the predicted safety level di when the
actual building safety state is si. This cost represents
a monetary expression of the potential casualties,
the economic, social, or environmental loss, and it
encodes the goals of the community. We assume that
the cost grows with the inflation rate γ. We determine
the optimal predicted safety level, d∗i (x), for building
i, by minimizing the expected cost of this decision,
i.e.,
d∗i (x) = arg min
di
E [ci(di, Si)|X = x] . (10)
The optimal expected cost is simply:
c∗i (x) = E [ci(d∗i (x), Si)|X = x] (11)
2.4 Pareto front
To derive the Pareto front of the problem defined
by Eqs. (4) and (5), we need to quantify the ex-
pected cost and the variance of the cost for all bud-
get levels. First, we generate a set of budget lev-
els, r1 < r2 < · · · < rk, where r1 = 0, and rK is
the budget level required to inspect all buildings.
Then, for each k = 1, . . . ,K, we sample M events,{(
t(m), x(m), s
(m)
1:N
)}M
m=1
using the probability distri-
butions of the occurrence time, T , the event intensity
X, and the state of the building Si conditioned on
X. Then, we approximate the expected cost by:
E
[
e−βTC(T,X, S1:N )|r = rk
] ≈ C¯(rk) :=
1
M
M∑
m=1
e−βt
(m)
C
(
t(m), x(m), s
(m)
1:N ; r = rk
)
, (12)
and the variance by:
V
[
e−βTC(T,X, S1:N )|r = rk
] ≈ σ2C(rk) :=
1
M−1
∑M
m=1
{
e−βt
(m)
C
(
t(m), x(m), s
(m)
1:N ; r = rk
)
− C¯(rk)
}2
,
(13)
respectively. After calculating the expected cost and
variance of the cost for each possible budget level, we
plot the Pareto frontier to visualize the budgets that
are not dominated.
3 Illustrative Example
3.1 The data set
To demonstrate the approach and illustrate the infor-
mation it can supply, we use a crowd-sourced dataset
moderated by a group of researchers in the European
Centre for Training and Research in Earthquake En-
gineering (EUCENTRE) in Pavia, Italy. This dataset
was collected within the EU Consortium project, SAS-
PARM2.0, to demonstrate a crowdsourcing based
framework to facilitate the completion or creation
of an exposure model and its corresponding physi-
cal vulnerability model. Citizens, practitioners, and
students filled out specific forms developed for this
project, which focused on documenting the structural
characteristics of 581 buildings in the city of Nablus, a
commercial and cultural center located in the north-
ern West Bank that is adjacent to the seismically
active Dead Sea Transform and associated geological
faults. The dataset includes typological and metric
data for the structures, e.g., building construction
and configuration, number of stories, floor area, and
associated fragility functions. The fragility function
sets were generated, based on SP-BELA procedures,
to be appropriate for the structures in the dataset
(Di Meo et al., 2018).
3.1.1 Description of the building inventory
Fig. (1) shows a statistical summary of the key char-
acteristics of the building inventory, including the
type of construction, the number of stories, and the
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Fig. 1: Building inventory taxonomy.
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Fig. 2: Floor area category distribution of the building inventory.
floor area category. Each building is assigned a des-
ignation in terms of its construction and structural
configuration as: masonry (M), reinforced concrete
(RC), reinforced concrete shear wall (RCS). In the
case of geometric irregularities that would result in
torsional behavior the letter “T” is added to its des-
ignation, e.g., RCT or RCST. The fragility functions
of these irregular buildings are also updated with re-
spect to their regular counterparts using a simplified
approach that makes use of correction coefficients
(Grigoratos et al., 2018). The vast majority of the
buildings contained in this inventory are M, RC, and
RCT, and there are only three buildings designated
as RCS and two designated as RCST (Di Meo et al.,
2018). Each building in the inventory is also assigned
to a category based on its floor area. The original
building inventory uses alphabetic letters to represent
these categories (see Table (1)). However, we redefine
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Table 1: Categories used for the building inventory to represent floor area.
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these categories according to the assumed cost of
field inspection grouped by area. Fig. (2) shows the
distribution of buildings using both the original and
redefined categories. The actual use of each of the
buildings in the inventory is not documented. How-
ever, for purposes of demonstrating the method, we
assign each building into one of three usage categories.
In particular, 565 buildings are classified as residen-
tial, 12 as commercial, and 4 as critical facilities (e.g.,
hospitals, police/fire stations). To implement and
demonstrate our methodology, we need to identify:
(i) the type of construction and the number of stories
to properly assign a representative fragility function
to each building; (ii) the floor area category, which
is used to estimate the field inspection cost; and (iii)
the designated use of each building. These data are
used to quantify the cost imposed on the community.
3.1.2 Fragility functions of the data set
Fragility functions are assigned to each building to
estimate its most probable state after the event. An
original set of fragility functions for this particular
building inventory was developed by Di Meo et al.
(2018) based on the available data, including construc-
tion, geometric information (e.g., floor area, number
of stories) and the structural configuration (e.g., reg-
ular, irregular) of each of the buildings. Observed
damage data were not available for Palestine, and
thus Di Meo et al. (2018) used results obtained for
Italian buildings with similar construction. The set
of fragility functions was generated using a simpli-
fied pushover-based earthquake loss assessment (SP-
BELA). SP-BELA was initially developed as a means
to rapidly assess the vulnerability of Italian build-
ings. SP-BELA procedures were specified for masonry
buildings, RC frame buildings, and precast concrete
buildings (Borzi et al., 2008a,b; Bolognini et al., 2008).
Originally SP-BELA featured three limit states: light
damage (LS1), significant damage (LS2), and collapse
(LS3). However, (Gru¨nthal, 1998) adapted the set of
fragility functions developed based on this data set
to correspond to the EMS98 scale (Gru¨nthal, 1998).
This scale involves five damage levels, i.e., slight dam-
age (D1), moderate damage (D2), extensive damage
(D3), complete damage (D4), and collapse (D5). The
relationship between damage level and limit state
was defined using observed damage data in a series
of recent Italian earthquakes beginning in 1976 with
the Friuli event through to 2002 with the Emilia
event(Faravelli et al., 2017).
According to the EMS98 scale, D4 and D5 refer
to building states defined as completely damaged and
collapsed, respectively, and thus are clearly well be-
yond a state in which they can be considered usable.
Inspection to distinguish between these two states
is not necessary. Thus, based on the definitions in
EMS98 and for purposes of illustration, we pair the
D1 fragility function with a safety level 1, D2 with
the safety level 2 state, and D3 and above with safety
level 3. Also, the original building inventory used to
determine the set of fragility functions consists of
buildings that are not seismically designed. Our sim-
ulations show that, with even a small intensity event,
there is a high probability of all buildings in the
inventory reaching safety level 3. Thus, to consider
an inventory that is more representative of a typical
community with modern construction and designed
according to seismic building codes, we modify the
set of fragility functions by multiplying both µ and
σ by a selected coefficient. The coefficient is selected
based on judgment as 2.5, 3.0 and 3.5 for residential
buildings, commercial buildings and critical facilities,
respectively, to better represent reasonable perfor-
mance levels for seismically designed buildings.
To apply the method developed herein, we need
to interpret the fragility functions for a given building
to represent the probability of the occurrence of each
safety level. To accomplish this, we first select the
fragility function that corresponds to a given safety
level and then transform that fragility function, which
is defined as the probability of exceeding a partic-
ular limit state, to a curve that corresponds to the
probability of the post-event building state being as-
sociated with each safety level. To demonstrate these
steps, consider the fragility functions of a 2 story
8 Lenjani et al.
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Fig. 3: Example showing (a) the fragility functions for a 2 story RC residential building, and (b) the
corresponding probability functions.
RC residential building. Fig. (3a) shows the fragility
functions for this building corresponding to damage
states D1 (green dashed), D2 (yellow solid), and D3
(red dotted). Fig. (3b) shows the corresponding prob-
ability functions, which represent the probability of
that building being in the corresponding state (in
this case, the associated safety level) after the event,
as explained in Sec. (2.2).
3.2 Cost function to quantify losses due to incorrect
classification
We define an intuitive cost function to compare the
consequences of the decisions. The cost function has
two terms, corresponding to: (i) the estimated cost
of building inspections to the community, (ii) the
estimated cost associated with making an incorrect
decision regarding the state of a building. The val-
ues in our cost function are approximated and for
a specific community, and they should be adjusted
to represent the actual costs for that target commu-
nity. The cost of a field inspection for a building is
determined based on the size of the building, and is
constant within a given category of building. Thus,
it is the product of the number of stories, the aver-
age floor area of the building based on its category
(as defined in Table (1)), and the cost per unit area
for a field inspection. The inspection cost increases
with the floor area category, and is selected as $500
for the first category (0-100 m2) and increases by
$500 for each subsequent floor area category. This
value represents the actual monetary cost for a struc-
tural engineer to do a field inspection (Home Advisor,
2018; Angie’s List, 2018). Due to the high-demand
for qualified structural engineer’s time in emergency
conditions, we adjust this field inspection rate. Here
we magnify this value by a factor of 10. The second
term in the cost function is associated with the incor-
rect assignment of predetermined safety states, and
represents the cost that a wrong decision will impose
on the community. If every building is inspected by a
qualified engineer after the event, the resulting cost
to the community will be a fixed amount. However, if,
for instance, the predetermined safety level and the
actual state of every building match, the resulting ad-
ditional cost to the community would be zero. If any
single building is under-rated (i.e., the predetermined
safety level is lower than the actual safety level), that
incorrect decision introduces a degree of risk associ-
ated with the error (i.e., allowing residents to enter a
safety level 3 building), and this may result in casu-
alties and thus may impose a tremendous additional
cost to the community (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). On
the other hand, if the building is over-rated, the in-
correct decision is conservative (i.e., unnecessarily
restricting access to a building that is functional),
and this may impose a considerable additional cost
to the community in the form of lost revenue for
commercial buildings, hotel costs for occupants of
residential buildings, or a gap in critical services (e.g.,
hospital services, police and fire services). These costs
may not, however, be as massive as in the previous
case.
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Table 2: Cost function for residential buildings (in $ per floor area category).
Decision
safety level 1 safety level 2 safety level 3
safety level 1 0 350,000 750,000
safety level 2 3,750,000 0 500,000
safety level 3 7,250,000 3,600,000 0
A
ct
u
a
l
S
ta
te
Table 3: Cost function for commercial buildings (in $ per floor area category).
Decision
safety level 1 safety level 2 safety level 3
safety level 1 0 3,000,000 5,500,000
safety level 2 89,000,000 0 4,000,000
safety level 3 14,500,000 7,200,000 0
A
ct
u
a
l
S
ta
te
Table 4: Cost function for critical facilities (in $ per floor area category).
Decision
safety level 1 safety level 2 safety level 3
safety level 1 0 7,750,000 15,000,000
safety level 2 25,750,000 0 10,000,000
safety level 3 36,250,000 18,000,000 0
A
ct
u
a
l
S
ta
te
The cost function for the three types of build-
ings includes the same terms, but the contributing
costs and their weightings are different. For this ex-
ample, the added cost of under-rating in the case
of commercial buildings and critical facilities are set
to be two times and five times that of residential
buildings, respectively. The added cost of over-rating
in the case of commercial buildings is much larger
due to both the short-term and long-term effects on
the community’s economy. If a commercial building
is over-rated as “safety level 3”, any businesses in
the building will be closed until an inspection can
be performed. For buildings containing critical fa-
cilities, over-rating has a severe impact in terms of
the resulting gap in critical services available to the
community. Here we include an importance coeffi-
cient associated with each building type to represent
the relative costs. The importance coefficients are
1, 2, and 5 for residential, commercial, and critical
buildings, respectively. Tables (2), (3) and (4) pro-
vides the relative additional costs associated with
predetermined safety levels used in this case study.
3.3 Discussion on consequences of communities
risk-oriented decisions
To demonstrate the method, we consider four com-
munities with different attitudes toward risk. The
four communities are described as: unprepared, risk-
neutral, risk-averse, and extremely risk-averse. Here
the term risk refers to the risk originating from erro-
neous decisions in pre-classifying the post-event safety
level. Thus, at the one extreme, we assume that the
extremely risk-averse community will prefer to in-
spect all buildings in the community to eliminate any
uncertainty due to this source of risk. Alternatively,
at the other extreme, the unprepared community
does not allocate a budget for inspection, and must
rely on the predetermined safety levels assigned to all
buildings, which is the typical output of many recent
past projects that targeted the development of urban
or regional risk models to assist decision-making. The
risk-neutral community simply aims to minimize the
expected present value of the total cost imposed on
the community. The risk-averse community prefers
to allocate a reasonable inspection budget, which
supports minimizing both the risk and the expected
total cost imposed on the community.
The results for these sample communities are
shown in Fig. (4a) which shows the mean vs. the
standard deviation of the cost imposed on each of
the communities for a range of budgets between zero
and the maximum budget required to perform a field
inspection on all buildings. In this case, this value
is $60,120,000. To obtain these results, we sample
the event intensity from a lognormal distribution
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(b) Non-exceedance probability of the cost for each community.
Fig. 4: Sample communities.
with mean and standard deviation of -0.8 and 0.3,
respectively, i.e., lnX ∼ N (−0.8, 0.09) and the next
occurrence time of the event from an exponential
distribution with a rate of 300, i.e., T ∼ E(1/300) .
For each budget level we run 1000 simulations and
we calculate the actual total cost for each simulation.
Using these 1000 simulations we can estimate the
expected cost and risk as described in Sec. (2.4). We
assume the interest rate, the discount rate and the
inflation rate are equal in this case, α = γ = β = 0.03.
Based on the results shown in Fig. (4a), it is clear
that changing the allocated inspection budget can
have a dramatic effect on the expected cost to the
community. Additionally, the allocated inspection
budget will also affect the actual level of risk in the
community, or the volatility, which is captured in
the standard deviation. The two noteworthy budget
levels mentioned in Section 2 are noted in the figure
including: (i) the risk-neutral community having the
budget level which causes the lowest Sharpe ratio
(the minimum risk-adjusted cost); and (ii) extremely
risk-averse community having the budget level which
causes the lowest volatility (minimum standard devi-
ation).
Next, we consider the distribution of the result-
ing cost for each of the defined communities based
on a certain pre-determined inspection budget. To
examine this distribution, we simulate the event by
sampling the event parameters from intensity level
and occurrence time distributions, and sampling the
pre-classifying decisions from the safety level dis-
tributions. We perform 1,000 random simulations,
and for each simulation we compute the total cost
imposed on the community. Fig. (4b) shows the re-
sulting non-exceedance probability of the total cost
for each sample community.
Figs. (5a), (5b), (5c), and (5d) show the corre-
sponding results for the unprepared, risk-neutral,
risk-averse, and extremely risk-averse communities,
respectively. Here we assume an event happened right
now, and we consider three different fixed intensity
levels for the event, 0.1, 0.4 and 0.7. For each intensity
level, we demonstrate the distribution of the optimal
predetermined safety states of the buildings. Further-
more, for each predetermined safety state, we show
the distribution of the buildings that are selected to
be either inspected or pre-classified. Regardless of
the intensity of the event, the extremely risk-averse
community allocates the full inspection budget and
performs a structural inspection on each building.
Based on the building inventory used in this example,
and the inspection costs assumed, $60, 120,000 is
necessary to inspect all buildings in the community
no matter what event occurs. Fig. (5d) provides the
statistics of the results for the extremely risk-averse
community. The distribution of the minimum cost
predetermined safety levels assignment for each inten-
sity level in the case of the unprepared community
is the same as that of the extremely risk-averse com-
munity. However, the resulting decisions regarding
performing an inspection or using the predetermined
safety levels for each of the buildings are entirely
different. Because the budget allocated for inspection
in the unprepared community is zero, all buildings
must use their predetermined safety levels, as shown
in Fig. (5a). It is likely that the extremely risk-averse
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(b) Risk-neutral community.
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(c) Risk-averse community.
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(d) Extremely risk-averse community.
Fig. 5: Statistics of the results for three events with different intensities for the different communities.
approach to inspection is not feasible in the real-
world for economic reasons, but this is included for
purposes of illustrating the consequences of different
approaches. The opposite approach, the unprepared
community (an especially risk-taking attitude) will
also impose a significant cost on the community which
is likely to exceed that of the other cases. The risk-
neutral community takes the approach of minimizing
the total cost, which, based on these results, is ex-
pected to occur by specifying $30,450,000. Fig. (5b)
shows the distribution of decisions made, considering
the three levels of event intensity, for the risk-neutral
community.
The budget that minimizes the imposed cost on
the community may not necessarily minimize the
variation of the cost. So let us consider how to de-
termine the inspection budget that minimizes both
the expected value and the variation of the cost. We
thus define a risk-averse community as one which
decides to rationally reduce the total cost imposed
on community, avoiding risk as much as possible.
To accomplish this goal, we use modern portfolio
theory which argues that an investment’s risk and
return characteristics should not be viewed alone, but
should be evaluated by how the investment affects
the overall portfolio’s risk and return (Markowitz,
1991). Because our application examines investing
the budget in performing post-event inspections, in-
stead of maximizing the return we need to minimize
the cost while minimizing the risk. The fundamental
objective of this analysis is to identify an efficient set
of budgets, known as an efficient frontier, that offers
the minimum expected costs for a given level of risk.
The gray dashed line in Fig. (6a), and (6b) shows the
efficient frontier. Fig. (6b) is the zoomed view of the
dotted box shown in (6a). Once we have the efficient
frontier, a decision-maker can determine the desired
inspection budget, considering other criteria, e.g.,
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Fig. 6: Pareto front.
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(a) Hourly inspection rate is half.
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(b) Hourly inspection rate is double.
Fig. 7: Cost distribution and Pareto front for regions with different hourly inspection rates.
a maximum threshold of the budget or a maximum
risk tolerance of the community. Here we assume that
such a risk-averse community has set a maximum
threshold of $45,090,000 on the budget, as shown
in Fig. (6). This result indicates that as long as the
allocated budget is selected to be on the Pareto front,
applying the other decision criteria of the community
would not lead to a catastrophic result.
Fig. (5c) provides the statistics of the results
for the risk-averse community for three events with
different levels of intensity, including 0.1, 0.4 and
0.7. By selecting a reasonable inspection budget in
advance, a majority of the high priority buildings are
identified for field inspection while the buildings with
lower priority are pre-classified.
The appropriate budget for a community to allo-
cate does depend on the relative cost of inspection
and the cost to the community for making incorrect
predictions, see Eq. (3), which depend on the region.
To consider such regional variations, we consider two
other communities with lower (half) and higher (dou-
ble) relative hourly inspection rates. Fig. (7a) shows
the resulting cost distribution and Pareto front for
the region with lower inspection rates. Here, half of
the maximum budget is sufficient to inspect all the
buildings. However, in a region with higher inspection
rates, shown in Fig. (7b), spending the maximum
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(b) Hourly inspection rate is double.
Fig. 8: Non-exceedance probability of the cost for each community for regions with different hourly inspection
rates.
considered budget will reduce the standard devia-
tion considerably but it can not make it zero. Figs.
(8a) and (8b) show the non-exceedance probability of
the total cost for the sample communities in regions
with both lower and higher inspection rates, respec-
tively. In a community with a lower inspection rate,
Fig. (8a) shows that the inspection budget assigned
for the risk-neutral community will result in a very
small chance of imposing more than 30,000 $ cost on
community. However, in a community with a higher
inspection rate, Fig. (8b), it is probable that the
resulting cost on the community would be 10 times
larger, in this case 300,000 $.
4 Conclusions
Communities aiming to be resilient need tools at their
disposal that empower them to both respond to and
prepare for extreme events. With minimal inventory
data, communities can set desired objectives, and
create a budget based on those desired objectives
to cope with future disruptive events. Here we de-
velop and demonstrate a simple approach and an
associated computational tool that can be used for
various types of disruptions, and with varying levels
of detailed data. The method is intended for rapid
and effective planning of building inspections while
also minimizing the expected cost of this process to
the community. The key idea behind prioritizing the
structures for inspection is that the post-event safety
level of some structures can be predicted reliably
using available information. These predicted safety
levels can be adopted with minimum consequences
for the community. This approach goes beyond past
projects focused on developing urban or regional risk
models. An additional benefit of our approach is it can
be used to determine an appropriate budget, based
on desired objectives, that the community can set
aside to prepare for building inspections after a poten-
tial future event. This approach is relatively simple
and supplies necessary guidance for decisions in the
case of a disruptive event. Furthermore, this study
represents an example of how the typical outcome of
numerous urban or regional risk analysis initiatives
can be used in practice, as well as assessing the im-
pact of using eventually inaccurate information of
that sort.
In addition, the method can be used by policymak-
ers in determining a suitable field inspection budget
in advance. We illustrate this approach using a re-
alistic building inventory to demonstrate its use to
determine field inspection priorities for hypothetical
events. Sample communities, with different perspec-
tives regarding what level of risk is tolerable, are
considered to illustrate the technique and how the re-
sults can support decisions. The results demonstrate
that, when resources are limited, field inspection may
be performed in the aftermath of a natural event by
prioritizing certain buildings and pre-classifying less
critical ones based on expected performance levels.
This capability will reduce overall costs and support
a faster start to the rest of the recovery processes.
Communities can also use this approach, with their
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relevant input data, to determine a suitable budget
and plan for a range of resilience goals based on
risk tolerance. This approach is shown to support
informed decision-making at a community-level, but
also at a national or individual level, to prepare for
and mitigate the impact of disruptive events.
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